• New polarizations are making their appearance on the global scene. For instance, one new interesting group gained some credibility in the public discourse on the occasion of the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change: countries “most affected by climate change”. This rests upon the assumption that climate change, like other environmental problems, involves an externality: the emission of greenhouse gases damages others at no cost to the agent responsible for the emissions. It remains to be seen if and to what extent this is true; but nevertheless the idea of a new «environmental divide» is on the table now.
• New groupings seem to take the place of old polarizations. For instance, after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the East/West confrontation, new cleavages are emerging: there was a shift for the Third World discourse based on development differentials to the one, more cultural in character, centered on the concept of Global South. Should we care for the possibility of a political reconceptualization and radicalization of the cleavage between NWS and NNWS? I think that the consolidation of the idea of a “nuclear divide” would be dangerous for the international order and stability
• We must work in order to avoid this involution of the non-proliferation regime. It is well known that there are at least three fundamental problems connected to the NPT that have to do with universality, effectiveness and credibility.
• The lack of universality of the NPT is, at moment, a serious flaw of the non-proliferation regime; but curiously it is not the most worrisome. There is a non-proliferation paradox: in the last years we experienced more problems with states that are or used to be members of NPT (Iran, North Korea) than with States that are not members. We should ask ourselves why states that are outside the system are more reliable of NPT members. There is no easy answer. Political and strategic situations and predictability are key elements; we should infer that membership is a necessary but non sufficient condition to strengthen nuclear security and in the international system.
• This leads us to the second reason of weakness of the present non-proliferation system: implementation. Verification is always the defining factor of any regime of arms control. As the IAEA itself proclaims, “an effective safeguards system functions as a confidence building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community”. That’s why the Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement is a cornerstone of a strengthened non-proliferation system. Would be possible to consider that the principles of the additional protocol (in particular, the requirement for a State to allow access to any place on a nuclear site or to other locations where nuclear material is, or may be, present) is becoming a general principles of the international nuclear order? Although this is very hard to confirm, still the issue at stake would suggest exploring such an idea.
• The third and most important problem of the current non-proliferation regime has to do with the credibility of the system. Of the three pillars of the NPT, non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology, disarmament is the crucial element. That’s why the recent agreement signed by President Obama and President Medvedev to reduce strategic nuclear warheads are very important, well beyond the merit of the problem. But honestly we should ask ourselves if bilateral agreements, even in the case of the two prominent nuclear powers, are still the answer to the general goal of disarmament. The challenge of the future is to put in place a truly international or multilateral framework for disarmament. We should seek a middle ground between the utopian perspective of a legally binding treaty for nuclear disarmament and the insufficient perspective of relying solely on the good will and political readiness of the great powers. If a sort of «soft law» can apply to «hard power», we should pursue that solution.
• Expanding a little bit on the concept of disarmament, we should not underestimate a possible link between conventional predominance and the risk of providing indirect incentive for acquiring military nuclear capability as the sole possibility to face that predominance. This connection is politically unacceptable, but consistent from a pure logical point of view. So when we talk about disarmament we should also consider that part of conventional military arsenal that could be considered oversized vis-à-vis the general purpose of ensuring national defense or maintaining an acceptable level of order and stability in the international system.
• One aspect of the “global zero” perspective is very controversial. Global zero is a concept that could be challenged on the basis that nuclear weapons cannot be “disinvented”. In the words of George Perkovich, «abolishing nuclear weapons does not mean disinventing them. No human creation can be disinvented. But societies have decided that certain technologies – like mass-scale gas chambers — are too unsafe or undesirable to tolerate.» For instance, we succeed in the endeavour of “disinventing” - at least politically – land-mines and, to some extent, also biological and chemical weapons.
• Another point seems to me very relevant to this debate. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. We should see them not only as a strategic tool, but also as a political and cultural problem. Civilian casualties are a “natural” consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. There is an undeniable connection between nuclear weapons and humanitarian international law and between nuclear weapons and the idea of human security. Although one can understand that the policy of “non-first use” cannot be adopted overnight, one should also recognize the problematic ethical dimension of this choice.
• We tend to concentrate mainly on strategic weapons: but what about tactical nuclear weapons? The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is very prudent in this field, and this is a considerate move. According to the NPR, the U.S. should «continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent. No changes in U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made without close consultations with our allies and partners.» This is a crucial NATO issue and also a European problem if we talk about seriously a common defense policy of the EU. We are far from reaching a common position on that delicate matter, but we cannot be content with finding a common ground only on secondary or less relevant questions concerning the European security.
• One last observation has to do with the relation between regional security alliances and nuclear weapons. Is the “universal” approach of NPT always workable and productive? What about putting in place regional sub-systems of cooperative security (rather than collective defense arrangements)? I’m thinking of the OSCE model rather than NATO model. The reassuring function of nuclear weapons (in terms of «umbrellas») could be replaced by reassuring security communities on a regional scale? At any rate, the coexistence of collective defense arrangements with cooperative security arrangements – taking into account also the risks coming from non-state actors - could facilitate the implementation of nuclear disarmament programs. As we can read in the NPR, «the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.»
Political dimensions of nuclear non-proliferation
Il 14 aprile saro' a Washington per partecipare ad un seminario internazionale sulla non-proliferazione nucleare. Ecco gli appunti che ho preparato per il mio intervento:
